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Abstract: Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) provides a very expressive framework for multi-agent planning
that can deal with nondeterminism, partial observability, sensing actions, and arbitrary nesting of beliefs
about other agents’ beliefs. However, as we show in this paper, this expressiveness comes at a price. The
planning framework is undecidable, even if we allow only purely epistemic actions (actions that change
only beliefs, not ontic facts). Undecidability holds already in the S5 setting with at least 2 agents, and even
with 1 agent in S4. It shows that multi-agent planning is robustly undecidable if we assume that agents can
reason with an arbitrary nesting of beliefs about beliefs. We also prove a corollary showing undecidability
of the DEL model checking problem with the star operator on actions (iteration).
Key-words: Automated planning, dynamic epistemic logic, multi-agent systems, undecidability.
This research report is an extended version of the article published in the proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), Beijing, August 2013.
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Indécidabilité en planification épistémique
(version étendue)
Résumé : La logique épistémique dynamique (DEL) est un formalisme logique très expressif pour la
planification épistémique qui permet de rendre compte du non-déterminisme, de l’observation partielle,
des actions de perception, et de croyances d’ordre supérieur portant sur les croyances d’autres agents.
Cependant, comme nous le montrons dans ce rapport, cette expressivité a un coût. Ce formalisme pour la
planification est indécidable, et cela même si nous nous restreignons aux actions purement épistémiques
(les actions qui changent seulement les croyances, pas les faits du monde). L’indécidabilité est déjà
présente dans le cadre de la logique S5 avec au moins 2 agents, et même dans le cas d’un seul agent
avec la logique S4. Cela montre que la planification multi-agent est indécidable de façon robuste si
on suppose que les agents peuvent raisonner avec un enchevêtrement arbitraire de croyances d’ordre
supérieur sur les croyances d’autres agents. Nous prouvons aussi un corollaire montrant que le problème
du model checking de la logique épistémique dynamique (DEL) est indécidable avec l’opérateur étoile
sur les actions (itération).
Mots-clés : Planification automatique, logique épistémique dynamique, systèmes multi-agents, indécid-
abilité.
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1 Introduction
Recently a number of authors have independently started developing new and very expressive frame-
works for automated planning based on dynamic epistemic logic [Bolander and Andersen, 2011,
Löwe et al., 2011, Aucher, 2012, Pardo and Sadrzadeh, 2012]. Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) extends
ordinary modal epistemic logic [Hintikka, 1962] by the inclusion of event models to describe actions, and
a product update operator that defines how epistemic models are updated as the consequence of execut-
ing actions described through event models [Baltag et al., 1998]. Using epistemic models as states, event
models as actions, and the product operator as state transition function, one immediately gets a planning
formalism based on DEL.
One of the main advantages of this formalism is expressiveness. Letting states of planning tasks be
epistemic models implies that we have something that generalizes belief states, the classical approach
to planning with nondeterminism and partial observability [Ghallab et al., 2004].1 Compared to standard
planning formalisms using belief states, the DEL-based approach has the advantage that actions (event
models) encode both nondeterminism and partial observability [Andersen et al., 2012], and hence that
observability can be action dependent, and we do not need observation functions on top of action descrip-
tions. Active sensing actions are also expressible in the DEL-based framework. Another advantage of the
DEL-based framework is that it generalizes immediately to the multi-agent case. Both epistemic logic
and DEL are by default multi-agent formalisms, and the single-agent situation is simply a special case.
Hence the formalism provides a planning framework for multi-agent planning integrating nondetermin-
ism and partial observability. It can be used both for adversarial and cooperative multi-agent planning.
Finally, the underlying epistemic logic also allows agents to represent their beliefs about the beliefs of
other agents, hence allowing them to do Theory of Mind modeling. Theory of Mind (ToM) is a concept
from cognitive psychology referring to the ability of attributing mental states (beliefs, intentions, etc.) to
other agents [Premack and Woodruff, 1978]. Having a ToM is essential for successful social interaction
in human agents [Baron-Cohen, 1997], hence can be expected to play an equally important role in the
construction of socially intelligent artificial agents.
The flip side of the expressivity advantages of the DEL-based planning framework is that
the plan existence problem is undecidable in the unrestricted framework. This was proven
in [Bolander and Andersen, 2011] by an encoding of Turing machines as 3-agent planning tasks (leading
to a reduction of the Turing machine halting problem to the 3-agent plan existence problem). The proof
made essential use of actions with postconditions, that is, ontic actions that make factual changes to the
world (e.g. writing a symbol to a tape cell of a Turing machine). One could speculate that undecidability
relied essentially on the inclusion of ontic actions, but in the present paper we prove this not to be the
case. We prove that plan existence is undecidable even when only allowing purely epistemic (non-ontic)
actions, and already for 2 agents. This is by an encoding of two-counter machines as planning tasks. We
also prove that even single-agent planning is undecidable on S4 frames.
Given that we deal with multi-agent situations, it is important to specify our modeling approach, and
in particular whether the modeler/planner is one of the agents. A classification of the different modeling
approaches and their respective formalisms can be found in [Aucher, 2010]. For ease of presentation, we
follow in this article the perfect external approach of (dynamic) epistemic logic and model the situation
from an external and omniscient point of view. This said, all our results in this article transfer to the
other modeling approaches if we replace epistemic models with internal models or imperfect external
models (i.e. multi-pointed models), which, as we said, generalize to a multi-agent setting the belief states
of classical planning [Bolander and Andersen, 2011] .
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we recall the core of the DEL framework. In Section
3, we relate our DEL-based approach to the classical planning approach and provide an example of an
1A belief state can be modeled as a set of propositional valuations, which again can be modeled as a connected S5 model of
epistemic logic.
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epistemic multi-agent planning task. In Section 4, we introduce two-counter machines which are used
in Sections 5 and 6 to prove our undecidability results. In Section 7, we derive from our results the
undecidability of the DEL model checking problem (for the language with the star operator on actions).
Finally, we discuss related work and end with some concluding remarks in Section 8.
2 Dynamic Epistemic Logic
In this section, we present the basic notions from DEL required for the rest of the article (see
[Baltag et al., 1998, van Ditmarsch et al., 2007, van Benthem, 2011] for more details). Following the
DEL methodology, we split our exposition into three subsections. In Section 2.1, we recall the syn-
tax and semantics of the epistemic language. In Section 2.2, we define event models, and in Section 2.3,
we define the product update. Finally, in Section 2.4, we define specific classes of epistemic and event
models that will be studied in the sequel.
2.1 Epistemic Models
Throughout this article, P is a countable set of atomic propositions (propositional symbols) of cardinality
at least two, and A is a non-empty finite set of agents. We will use symbols p, q, r, . . . for atomic propo-
sitions and numbers 0, 1, . . . for agents. The epistemic language L(P,A) is generated by the following
BNF:
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | 2iφ
where p ∈ P and i ∈ A. As usual, the intended interpretation of a formula 2iφ is “agent i believes φ”
or “agent i knows φ”. The formulas 3iφ, φ ∨ ψ and φ → ψ are abbreviations of ¬2i¬φ, ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ),
and ¬φ ∨ ψ respectively. We define > as an abbreviation for p ∨ ¬p and ⊥ as an abbreviation for p ∧ ¬p
for some arbitrarily chosen p ∈ P . The semantics of L(P,A) is defined as usual through Kripke models,
here called epistemic models.
Definition 1 (Epistemic models and states). An epistemic model of L(P,A) is a tripleM = (W,R, V ),
where
• W , the domain, is a finite set of worlds;
• R : A → 2W×W assigns an accessibility relation R(i) to each agent i ∈ A;
• V : P → 2W assigns a set of worlds to each atomic proposition; this is the valuation of that
variable.
The relation R(i) is usually abbreviated Ri, and we write v ∈ Ri(w) or wRiv when (w, v) ∈ R(i). For
w ∈W , the pair (M, w) is called an epistemic state of L(P,A).
Definition 2 (Truth conditions). Let an epistemic modelM = (W,R, V ) be given. Let i ∈ A, w ∈ W
and φ, ψ ∈ L(P,A). Then
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M, w |= ¬φ iff M, w 6|= φ
M, w |= φ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= φ andM, w |= ψ
M, w |= 2iφ iff for all v ∈ Ri(w),M, v |= φ
Example 1. Consider the following epistemic state of L({p}, {0, 1}).
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(M, w1) = w1 :p
0, 1
w2
0, 1
0, 1
Each world is marked by its name followed by a list of the propositional symbols being true at the
world (which is possibly empty if none holds true). Edges are labelled with the name of the relevant
accessibility relations (agents). We have e.g. (M, w1) |= ¬2ip ∧ ¬2i¬p for i = 0, 1: neither agent
knows the truth-value of p. For epistemic states (M, w) we use the symbol to mark the designated
world w.
2.2 Event Models
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) introduces the concept of event model (or action model) for mod-
eling the changes to epistemic states brought about by the execution of actions [Baltag et al., 1998,
Baltag and Moss, 2004]. Intuitively, in Definition 3 below, eQie′ means that while the possible event
represented by e is occurring, agent i considers possible that the event represented by e′ is in fact occur-
ring.
Definition 3 (Event models and epistemic actions). An event model of L(P,A) is a triple E =
(E,Q, pre), where
• E, the domain, is a finite non-empty set of events;
• Q : A → 2E×E assigns an accessibility relation Q(i) to each agent i ∈ A;
• pre : E → L(P,A) assigns to each event a precondition.
The relation Q(i) is generally abbreviated Qi, and we write v ∈ Qi(w) or wQiv when (w, v) ∈ Q(i).
For e ∈ E, (E , e) is called an epistemic action of L(P,A).
The event e in (E , e) is intended to denote the actual event that takes place when the action is executed.
Note that we assume that events do not cause factual changes in the world. Hence, we only consider
so-called epistemic events and not ontic events with postconditions, as in [van Ditmarsch et al., 2005,
van Benthem et al., 2006]. Our assumptions for dealing with epistemic planning will therefore also differ
from the assumptions used in [Bolander and Andersen, 2011].
2.3 Product Update
Definition 4 (Applicability). An epistemic action (E , e) is applicable in an epistemic state (M, w) if
(M, w) |= pre(e).
The product update yields a new epistemic state (M, w)⊗ (E , e) representing how the new situation
which was previously represented by (M, w) is perceived by the agents after the occurrence of the event
represented by (E , e).
Definition 5 (Product update). Given an epistemic action (E , e) applicable in an epistemic state (M, w),
whereM = (W,R, V ) and E = (E,Q, pre). The product update of (M, w) with (E , e) is defined as
the epistemic state (M, w)⊗ (E , e) = ((W ′, R′, V ′), (w, e)), where
W ′ ={(w, e) ∈W × E | M, w |= pre(e)}
R′i ={((w, e), (v, f)) ∈W ′ ×W ′ | wRiv and eQif}
V ′(p) ={(w, e) ∈W ′ | M, w |= p}.
Inria
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L transitive Euclidean reflexive
K
KT X
K4 X
K45 X X
S4 X X
S5 X X X
Fig. 1: L-epistemic states and actions
Example 2. Continuing Example 1, the following is an example of an applicable epistemic action of
L({p}, {0, 1}) in (M, w1):
(E1, e1) = e1 :p
0
e2 :>
0, 1
1
It corresponds to a private announcement of p to agent 0, that is, agent 0 is told that p holds (event
e1), but agent 1 thinks that nothing has happened (event e2). The product update is calculated as follows:
(M, w1)⊗ (E1, e1) = (w1, e1) :p
0 (w1, e2) :p
0, 1
(w2, e2)
0, 1
1
1 0, 1
In the updated state, agent 0 knows p (since 20p holds at (w1, e1)), but agent 1 didn’t learn anything
(doesn’t know p and believes that 0 doesn’t either).
2.4 Classes of Epistemic States and Actions
In this article, we consider epistemic states and actions where the accessibility relations satisfy specific
properties, namely transitivity (for all w, v, u, wRiv and vRiu imply wRiu, defined by the axiom 4:
2iφ → 2i2iφ), Euclidicity (for all w, v, u, wRiv and wRiu imply vRiu, defined by the axiom 5:
¬2iφ→ 2i¬2iφ) and reflexivity (for all w, wRiw, defined by the axiom T: 2iφ→ φ).
Different conditions on the accessibility relations correspond to different assumptions on the notions
of knowledge or belief [Fagin et al., 1995, Meyer and van der Hoek, 1995]. Modal logics of belief are
usually considered to be at least as strong as K45, i.e., they should validate at least modus ponens,
necessitation (from φ, infer 2iφ) and positive and negative introspection (Axioms 4 and 5 respectively).
Modal logics of knowledge are usually considered to be at least as strong as S4, i.e., they should validate
modus ponens, necessitation, Truth (Axiom T) and positive introspection (Axiom 4). In the literature,
it is often assumed that the logic of knowledge is S5, i.e., it validates moreover negative introspection
(Axiom 5). In the sequel we will refer to L-epistemic states and actions, where the conditions on these
models is given in Figure 1.
These classes of epistemic and event models are stable for the product update, i.e., for all L ∈
{K,KT,K4,K45,S4,S5}, if (M, w) is a pointed L-epistemic model and (E , e) is a pointed L-event
model applicable in (M, w) then (M, w)⊗ (E , e) is a pointed L-epistemic model.
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3 Classical and Epistemic Planning
In this section, we briefly relate the epistemic planning approach of DEL as pro-
pounded in [Bolander and Andersen, 2011, Löwe et al., 2011] with the classical planning
approach [Ghallab et al., 2004]. For more detailed connections, we refer the reader to
[Bolander and Andersen, 2011].
3.1 Classical Planning
Following [Ghallab et al., 2004], any classical planning domain can be represented as a restricted state-
transition system.
Definition 6 (Restricted state-transition system). A restricted state-transition system is a tuple Σ =
(S,A, γ), where
• S is a finite or recursively enumerable set of states;
• A is a finite set of actions;
• γ : S × A ↪→ S is a partial and computable state-transition function. The state-transition function
is partial, i.e., for any (s, a) ∈ S ×A, either γ(s, a) is undefined or γ(s, a) ∈ S.
Definition 7 (Classical planning task). A classical planning task is represented as a triple (Σ, s0, Sg),
where
• Σ is a restricted state-transition system;
• s0 is the initial state, a member of S;
• Sg is the set of goal states, a subset of S.
Definition 8 (Solution to a classical planning task). A solution to a classical planning task (Σ, s0, Sg)
is a finite sequence of actions (a plan) a1, a2, . . . , an such that:
1. For all i ≤ n, γ(γ(. . . γ(γ(s0, a1), a2), . . . , ai−1), ai) is defined;
2. γ(γ(. . . γ(γ(s0, a1), a2), . . . , an−1), an) ∈ Sg.
Note that finding solutions to classical planning tasks is always at least semi-decidable: given a plan-
ning problem, we can compute its state space (the space of states reachable by a sequence of actions
applied to the initial state) in a breadth-first manner, and if one of the goal states is reachable, we will
eventually find it.
3.2 Epistemic Planning
Here is the definition of epistemic planning tasks, which are special cases of classical planning tasks:
Definition 9 (Epistemic planning tasks). An epistemic planning task is a triple (s0, A, φg) where s0 is
a finite epistemic state, the initial state; A is a finite set of finite epistemic actions; φg is a formula in
L(P,A), the goal formula.
Any epistemic planning task (s0, A, φg) canonically induces a classical planning task
((S,A, γ), s0, Sg) given by:
• S = {s0 ⊗ a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ an | n ≥ 0, ai ∈ A}.
Inria
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• Sg = {s ∈ S | s |= φg}.
• γ(s, a) =
{
s⊗ a if a is applicable in s
undefined otherwise.
Hence, epistemic planning tasks are special cases of classical planning tasks. A solution to an epistemic
planning task (s0, A, φg) is a solution to the induced classical planning task.
Example 3. Let a1 denote the epistemic action (E1, e1) of Example 2 and let a2 denote the result of
replacing 0 by 1 and 1 by 0 everywhere in a1. The epistemic action a2 is a private announcement of p to
agent 1. Now consider an epistemic planning task (s0, A, φg), where s0 = (M, w1) is the epistemic state
from Example 1, and A ⊇ {a1, a2}. Let the goal be that both 0 and 1 know p, but don’t know that each
other knows: φg = 20p∧21p∧¬2021p∧¬2120p. It is easy to check that a solution to this epistemic
planning task is the action sequence a1, a2, since we have s0 ⊗ a1 ⊗ a2 |= φg . Hence a solution to the
task of both agents knowing p without suspecting that each other does, is to first announce p privately to
0 then privately to 1.
The following definition is adapted from [Erol et al., 1995].
Definition 10 (Plan existence problem). Let n ≥ 1 and L ∈ {K,KT,K4,K45,S4,S5} . PlanEx(L, n)
is the following decision problem: “Given an epistemic planning task T = (s0, A, φg) where s0 is an
L-epistemic state, A is a set of L-epistemic actions and |A| = n, does T have a solution?”
4 Two-counter Machines
We will prove undecidability of the plan existence problem, PLANEX(L, n), for various classes of epis-
temic planning tasks. Each proof is by a reduction of the halting problem for two-counter machines to
the plan existence problem for the relevant class of planning tasks. So, we first introduce two-counter
machines [Minsky, 1967, Hampson and Kurucz, 2012].
Definition 11 (Two-counter machines). A two-counter machine M is a finite sequence of instructions
(I0, . . . , IT ), where each instruction It, for t < T , is from the set
{inc(i), jump(j), jzdec(i, j) | i = 0, 1, j ≤ T}
and IT = halt. A configuration of M is a triple (k, l,m) ∈ N3 with k being the index of the current
instruction, and l,m being the current contents of counters 0 and 1, respectively. The computation func-
tion fM : N → N3 of M maps time steps into configurations, and is given by fM (0) = (0, 0, 0) and if
fM (n) = (k, l,m) then
fM (n+ 1) =

(k + 1, l + 1,m) if Ik = inc(0)
(k + 1, l,m+ 1) if Ik = inc(1)
(j, l,m) if Ik = jump(j)
(j, l,m) if Ik = jzdec(0, j) and l = 0
(j, l,m) if Ik = jzdec(1, j) and m = 0
(k + 1, l − 1,m) if Ik = jzdec(0, j) and l > 0
(k + 1, l,m− 1) if Ik = jzdec(1, j) and m > 0
(k, l,m) if Ik = halt .
We say that M halts if fM (n) = (T, l,m) for some n, l,m ∈ N.
Theorem 1. [Minsky, 1967] The halting problem for two-counter machines is undecidable.
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5 Single-agent Epistemic Planning
In this section, we assume that the set A is a singleton.
5.1 The General Case
We encode the halting problem of a two-counter machine M as an epistemic planning task in three steps:
1. We define epistemic models CHAIN(p, n) for encoding natural numbers, and epistemic states
s(k,l,m) for encoding configurations;
2. We define a finite set of epistemic actions FM for encoding the computation function fM ;
3. We encode the halting problem as an epistemic planning task using these models.
5.1.1 Encoding of Configurations
For each propositional symbol p ∈ P and each n ∈ N, we define an epistemic model CHAIN(p, n) as in
Figure 2. For each (k, l,m) ∈ N3, we define the epistemic state s(k,l,m) as in Figure 3. It encodes the
configurations (k, l,m) of two-counter machines.
5.1.2 Encoding of the Computation Function
First, we need some formal preliminaries:
Definition 12 (Path formulas). For every n ∈ N, we define the n-path formula as follows: γn :=
3n2⊥.
Lemma 1. Let n ∈ N and let (M, w) be an epistemic state. Then (M, w) |= γn iff there is a path of
length n starting in w and ending in a world with no successor (a sink).
Inria
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For each propositional symbol p ∈ P and each m,n ∈ N we define three event models INC(p),
DEC(p) and REPL(p, n,m) as in Figures 4–6. We have omitted edge labels, as we are in the single-agent
case.
Lemma 2. For all m,n ∈ N, for all p ∈ P ,
1. CHAIN(p, n)⊗ INC(p) = CHAIN(p, n+ 1)
2. if n > 0, CHAIN(p, n)⊗ DEC(p) = CHAIN(p, n− 1)
3. CHAIN(p, n)⊗ REPL(p, n,m) = CHAIN(p,m).
Proof. We only prove items 1 and 3. We first prove item 1. Introducing names for the nodes and events,
we can calculate as follows:
CHAIN(p, n)⊗ INC(p) =
w1:p
w2:p
wn+1:p
wn+2:p
n
+
1
⊗
e1 :p ∧ ¬γ0
e2 :p ∧ γ1
e3 :p ∧ γ0
=
(w1,e1):p
(wn+1,e1):p
(wn+1,e2):p
(wn+2,e3):p
n
+
2
=
CHAIN(p, n+ 1).
Now, we prove item 3. Introducing names for the nodes and events, we can calculate as follows:
CHAIN(p, n)⊗ REPL(p, n,m) =
w1:p
w2:p
wn+1:p
wn+2:p
n
+
1
⊗
e1:p∧¬γ0∧¬γn
e2:p∧¬γ0∧¬γn
em+1:p ∧¬γ0∧¬γn
em+2:p ∧γn∧¬γn−1
m
+
1
=
(w1,e1):p
(w1,e2):p
(w1,em+1):p
(w2,em+2):p
m
+
1
= CHAIN(p,m).
Definition 13. For all k ∈ N, we define the formulas φk as follows:
φk := 3(p1 ∧ ¬γk ∧ γk+1). (1)
Using Lemma 1 and the definition of s(k,l,m), we immediately get the following result:
Fact 1. For all k, l,m, k′ ∈ N,
s(k,l,m) |= φk′ iff k′ = k. (2)
Let M = (I0, . . . , IT ) be a two-counter machine. For all k < T and all l,m ∈ N, we de-
fine an epistemic action aM (k, l,m) as in Figures 7–10 depending on the values of Ik, l and m. If
k, l,m, k′, l′,m′ ∈ N, we write (k, l,m) ≈ (k′, l′,m′) when the following holds:
k = k′ and
{
l = 0 iff l′ = 0 if Ik = jzdec(0, j)
m = 0 iff m′ = 0 if Ik = jzdec(1, j)
RR n° 8310
12 G. Aucher & T. Bolander
φk
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p3
Fig. 7: The action aM (k, l,m) when Ik = inc(0).
The case Ik = inc(1) is by replacing p2 with p3
everywhere.
φk
R
E
P
L
(p
1
,k
,j
)
p2 p3
Fig. 8: The action aM (k, l,m) when Ik = jump(j).
φk ∧3(p2 ∧ γ1)
R
E
P
L
(p
1
,k
,j
)
p2 p3
Fig. 9: The action aM (k, l,m) when Ik =
jzdec(0, j), l = 0. Case Ik = jzdec(1, j),m = 0
is by replacing p2 with p3.
φk ∧ ¬3(p2 ∧ γ1)
IN
C
(p
1
)
D
E
C
(p
2
)
p3
Fig. 10: The action aM (k, l,m) when Ik =
jzdec(0, j), l > 0. Case Ik = jzdec(1, j),m > 0
is by replacing p2 with p3.
Note that when (k, l,m) ≈ (k′, l′,m′) then aM (k, l,m) = aM (k′, l′,m′), hence the following set is
finite:
FM := {aM (k, l,m) | k ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, l,m ∈ N} .
Lemma 3 below shows that FM really encodes the computation steps of the computation function.
Lemma 3. LetM = (I0, . . . , IT ) be a two-counter machine, l,m, n ∈ N and k < T . Then, the following
holds:
1. aM (k, l,m) is applicable in sfM (n) iff (k, l,m) ≈ fM (n);
2. sfM (n) ⊗ aM (fM (n)) = sfM (n+1).
Proof sketch. Assume that fM (n) = (k′, l′,m′). Item 1 is by case of Ik. We only consider the cases
Ik = inc(0) and Ik = jump(j). In these cases, aM (k, l,m) is an epistemic action of the form (E , e) with
pre(e) = φk. Hence using Fact 1 we get:
aM (k, l,m) is applicable in sfM (n) ⇔
s(k′,l′,m′) |= φk ⇔
k = k′ ⇔
(k, l,m) ≈ (k′, l′,m′),
because Ik = inc(0) or Ik = jump(j). Item 2 is by case of Ik′ . We only consider the case Ik′ = inc(0):
sfM (n) ⊗ aM (fM (n)) = s(k′,l′,m′) ⊗ aM (k′, l′,m′) = s(k′+1,l′+1,m) = sfM (n+1),
using Lemma 2 and that aM (k′, l′,m′) is the epistemic action of Fig. 7.
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5.1.3 Encoding of the Halting Problem
From Lemma 3, we derive the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Let M = (I0, . . . , IT ) be a two-counter machine. Define TM as the following single-agent
epistemic planning task on K: TM = (s(0,0,0),FM , φT ). Then TM has a solution iff M halts.
Proof. Using Lemma 3 and induction on m, we get that for all m ∈ N,
(a) aM (fM (m)) is applicable in the state s(0,0,0) ⊗ aM (fM (0))⊗ · · · ⊗ aM (fM (m− 1)), and is the
only applicable action from TM in this state.
(b) s(0,0,0) ⊗ aM (fM (0))⊗ · · · ⊗ aM (fM (m)) = sfM (m+1).
For an action sequence a0, . . . , an to be a solution to TM it must by definition (Section 3) satisfy:
(i) For all m ≤ n, am is applicable in s(0,0,0) ⊗ a0 ⊗ a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ am−1.
(ii) s(0,0,0) ⊗ a0 ⊗ a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ an |= φT .
First we prove that if TM has a solution, M halts. Assume a0, . . . , an is solution to TM . Then (i) and
(ii) holds. From (i) we get, using (a), that am = aM (fM (m)) for all m ≤ n. This implies s(0,0,0) ⊗
a0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ an = sfM (n+1), using (b), and hence (ii) gives us sfM (n+1) |= φT . Fact 1 now implies that
fM (n+ 1) = (T, l,m). Since T is the index of the halting instruction of M , this shows that M halts. We
have now proven that if TM has a solution then M halts.
Assume conversely thatM halts. Then fM (n+1) = (T, l,m) for some n. Define am = aM (fM (m))
for all m ≤ n. If we can prove (i) and (ii) we are done. (i) follows immediately from (a). From (b) we
can conclude s(0,0,0) ⊗ a0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ an = sfM (n+1). Since fM (n + 1) = (T, l,m), we must have
sfM (n+1) |= φT , by Fact 1. Hence, we can conclude that (ii) holds.
So, from Lemma 4 and Theorem 1, we obtain:
Theorem 2. PLANEX(K,1) is undecidable.
5.2 Epistemic Planning for K4, KT, K45, S4 and S5
We are going to prove an even stronger result than Theorem 2, namely that the plan existence problem
for S4 planning tasks is undecidable. The proof of this undecidability result generalizes the previous
proof, but we need an extra atomic proposition r. For better readability, we use four atomic propositions
p1, p2, p3 and r, although we could use only two. The idea underlying the proof is to replace worlds with
meta-worlds, which are in fact epistemic models.
5.2.1 Encoding of Configurations
The chains as defined in Figure 2 are replaced by the meta-chains of Figure 11. A rectangle meta-world
is the epistemic model delimited in Figure 11 by a rectangle, and an ellipse meta-world is the epistemic
model delimited in Figure 11 by the ellipse. Note that the worlds in an ellipse meta-world are related to
each other in both directions, unlike the worlds in a rectangle meta-world where the arrow is in only one
direction. Then, we define the epistemic model META-S(k,l,m) encoding the configuration (k, l,m) as in
Figure 3. Note that the roots of the meta-chains and the root w0 of META-S(k,l,m) are related to each other
in both directions, unlike the previous proof for the logic K.
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Fig. 11: META-CHAIN(p, n)
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Fig. 12: META-S(k,l,m)
5.2.2 Encoding of the Computation Function
The sub-model generated by a rectangle meta-world in a meta-chain is called a meta-path, and the length
of a meta-path is the number of rectangle meta-worlds in such a sequence minus one.
Definition 14 (Meta-path formulas). For all n ∈ N, we define the formulas χn inductively as follows:
χ0 := 2(¬r → 2¬r)
χn+1 := 2(¬r → 2(r → χn))
We then obtain a counterpart of Lemma 1:
Lemma 5. Let k, l,m ∈ N and let w ∈ META-S(k,l,m).
1. If w is in a rectangle meta-world and n ∈ N, then, META-S(k,l,m), w |= χn iff there is a meta-path
of length at least n starting at the rectangle meta-world containing w and ending in a rectangle
meta-world with no successor (rectangle) meta-world.
2. w is in a rectangle meta-world of META-S(k,l,m) iff META-S(k,l,m), w |= 2p for some p ∈
{p1, p2, p3}.
Proof sketch. The proof of the first item is by induction on n and by observing that, in a meta-path, χ0
holds only at the bottom last rectangle meta-world of the meta-path. The proof of the second item relies
on the fact that the worlds of an ellipse meta-chain are all connected to the root of META-S(k,l,m), which
satisfies neither p1, p2 nor p3.
Then, we define the event models META-INC(p), META-DEC(p) and META-REPL(p, n,m) as in Fig-
ures 13–15. Moreover, we define the following formulas which allow us to count the length of meta-
chains:
Definition 15. For all k ∈ N and all p ∈ P , we define the formulas ψk(p) as follows:
ψk(p) :=
{
32p ∧2(2p→ χ0) if k = 0;
3(2p ∧ ¬χk−1) ∧2(2p→ χk) if k > 0.
(3)
By Lemma 5, we easily get the following result:
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p ∧3¬p ∧ ¬r
p ∧3¬p ∧ r
p ∧3¬p ∧ ¬r
p ∧3¬p ∧ r
2p
Fig. 13: META-INC(p)
p ∧ ¬χ0
Fig. 14: META-DEC(p)
p ∧3¬p ∧ ¬r
p ∧3¬p ∧ r
p ∧3¬p ∧ ¬r
p ∧3¬p ∧ r
p ∧3¬p ∧ ¬r
p ∧3¬p ∧ r
m+ 1
Fig. 15: META-REPL(p, n,m)
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Fig. 16: The action eM (k, l,m) when Ik = inc(0).
The case Ik = inc(1) is by replacing p2 and p3 ev-
erywhere.
ψk(p1)
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Fig. 17: The action eM (k, l,m) when Ik =
jump(j).
Fact 2. For all k, l,m, k′ ∈ N,
META-S(k,l,m), w0 |= ψk′(p1) iff k′ = k
META-S(k,l,m), w0 |= ψl′(p2) iff l′ = l
META-S(k,l,m), w0 |= ψm′(p3) iff m′ = m.
Let M = (I0, . . . , IT ) be a two-counter machine. For all k < T and all l,m ∈ N, we define an
epistemic action eM (k, l,m) as in Figures 16–19 by replacing in Figures 7–10 INC, DEC and REPL with
META-INC, META-DEC and META-REPL respectively and by replacing φk with ψk. Note again that the
roots of META-INC, META-DEC and META-REPL and the root w0 of META-S(k,l,m) are related to each
other in both directions.
5.2.3 Encoding of the Halting Problem
If CHAIN, INC, DEC and the function aM are replaced in Lemmata 2 and 3 with META-CHAIN, META-INC,
META-DEC and the function eM respectively, then these Lemmata still hold. Therefore, Lemma 4 and
Theorem 2 also generalize to this S4 setting, and we finally obtain that:
Theorem 3. PLANEX(S4, 1) is undecidable.
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Fig. 18: The action eM (k, l,m) when Ik =
jzdec(0, j), l = 0. Case Ik = jzdec(1, j),m = 0
is by replacing p2 with p3.
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Fig. 19: The action eM (k, l,m) when Ik =
jzdec(0, j), l > 0. Case Ik = jzdec(1, j),m > 0
is by replacing p2 with p3.
As a direct corollary of Theorem 3, we have that single-agent epistemic planning forK4 is undecidable
as well. Despite all these negative results, there is still room for decidability in the single-agent case if
we assume that knowledge or belief are negatively introspective:
Theorem 4. PLANEX(K45, 1) and PLANEX(S5, 1) are decidable.
Proof. Any formula of K45 (and hence also of S5) is provably equivalent to a normal form formula
of degree 1 [Meyer and van der Hoek, 1995], i.e., a conjunction of disjunctions of the form φ ∨ 3iφ0 ∨
2iφ1 ∨ . . . ∨ 2iφn. Therefore, any epistemic planning task can be reduced equivalently to a classical
planning task whose states are epistemic models of height at most 1. So, because there is a finite number
of epistemic models of height at most 1 (for a finite set of propositional atoms), the state space of the
classical planning problem is finite. Hence, we immediately get decidability.
6 Multi-agent Epistemic Planning
In the multi-agent setting, we prove a strong result, namely that multi-agent epistemic planning is unde-
cidable for any logic between K and S5. The proof of this undecidability result generalizes the proof for
single-agent K given in Section 5.1. Like for the proof of undecidability of the previous section for S4,
the idea underlying the proof is to replace worlds with meta-worlds.
6.1 Encoding of Configurations
We encode configurations as epistemic states of two-agent S5. The worlds in CHAIN(p, n) of Figure 2
are replaced with the epistemic models META-WORLD′(p) of Figure 20. The way meta-worlds are con-
nected to each other to form a META-CHAIN′(p, n) is shown in Figure 21. Then, for each configura-
tion (k, l,m) ∈ N3, we define an epistemic state META-S′(k,l,m) by replacing in Figure 3 CHAIN with
META-CHAIN′ and by labeling the accessibility relations originating from the designated world with
agent 1. Note that as we are in S5, all relations are equivalence relations, but the reflexive, symmetric
and transitive closure is left implicit in figures.
6.2 Encoding of the Computation Function
Similarly to the case of single-agent K and S4, we define path formulas.
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Fig. 20: META-WORLD′(p)
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Fig. 21: META-CHAIN′(p, n)
p ∧ ¬λ0
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0
Fig. 22: META-INC′(p)
p ∧ ¬λ0 ∧ ¬µ0 ∧ ¬τ0
Fig. 23: META-DEC′(p)
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p ∧ τn
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p ∧ µn
1
1
0
3(m+1)
events
Fig. 24: META-REPL′(p, n,m)
Definition 16 (Meta-path’ formulas). For all p ∈ P and n ∈ N, we define the formulas λn(p), µn(p)
and τn(p) inductively by:
λ0(p) := p ∧21¬r
µ0(p) := p ∧30λ0(p) ∧ ¬λ0(p)
τ0(p) := p ∧ r ∧31µ0(p)
λn+1(p) := p ∧31µn(p) ∧ ¬µn(p) ∧ ¬r
µn+1(p) := p ∧30λn+1(p) ∧ ¬λn+1(p)
τn+1(p) := p ∧ r ∧31µn+1(p).
We then obtain a counterpart of Lemma 1:
Lemma 6. For all p ∈ P , n ∈ N, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3n+ 3:
META-CHAIN′(p, n), wj |= λi(p) iff j = 3n+ 3− 3i
META-CHAIN′(p, n), wj |= µi(p) iff j = 3n+ 2− 3i
META-CHAIN′(p, n), wj |= τi(p) iff j = 3n+ 1− 3i.
In other words, λi holds in the bottom world of the (i+1)th to last meta-world of META-CHAIN′(p, n),
µi in the top right world of the same meta-world and τi in the top left world of the same meta-world. Now
we define META-INC′(p), META-DEC′(p) and META-REPL′(p, n,m) as in Figures 22–24.
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Let M = (I0, . . . , IT ) be a two-counter machine. For all k < T and all l,m ∈ N, we define similarly
to the epistemic actions of Figures 16–19 an epistemic action e′M (k, l,m) from the epistemic actions of
Figures 7–10 by:
1. replacing INC, DEC and REPL with META-INC′, META-DEC′ and META-REPL′ respectively;
2. labeling the accessibility relations originating from the designated worlds with agent 1;
3. replacing φk with 31µk(p1);
4. replacing 3(p2 ∧ γ1) with 31µ0(p2).
6.3 Encoding of the Halting Problem
If CHAIN, INC, DEC, aM and s(k,l,m) are replaced in Lemmata 2 and 3 with META-CHAIN′, META-INC′,
META-DEC′, e′M and META-S
′
(k,l,m) respectively, then these Lemmata still hold. Therefore, Lemma 4 and
Theorem 2 also generalize to this two-agent S5 setting, and we finally obtain that:
Theorem 5. PLANEX(S5, n) is undecidable for any n ≥ 2.
7 DEL Model Checking
The DEL language L∗DEL is defined by the following BNF [van Ditmarsch et al., 2007]:
φ ::= p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | 2iφ | [pi]φ
pi ::= (E , e) | (pi ∪ pi) | (pi;pi) | pi∗
where p ∈ P , i ∈ A and (E , e) is any epistemic action. In DEL, one assumes that |A| > 1. The truth
conditions for the programs pi are defined as follows:
M, w |= [E , e]φ iff M, w |= pre(e) implies
(M, w)⊗ (E , e) |= φ
M, w |= [pi ∪ γ]φ iff M, w |= [pi]φ andM, w |= [γ]φ
M, w |= [pi; γ]φ iff M, w |= [pi][γ]φ
M, w |= [pi∗]φ iff for all finite sequences pi; . . . ;pi,
M, w |= [pi; . . . ;pi]φ
The formula [E , e]φ reads as “after the execution of the epistemic action (E , e), it holds that φ”. The
model checking problem is the following: “Given an epistemic state (M, w), a formula φ ∈ L∗DEL, is
it the case thatM, w |= φ?”. As an immediate corollary of our results, we have the following theorem.
It complements the result of [Miller and Moss, 2005] stating that the satisfiability problem of DEL is
undecidable.
Theorem 6. The model checking problem of the language L∗DEL is undecidable.
Proof. PLANEX(S5, n) is reducible to the model checking problem of the language L∗DEL: an epistemic
planning task T = (s0, A, φg) has a solution iff s0 |= ¬[A∗]¬φg holds.
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Single-agent Multi-agent
planning planning
K UD UD
KT UD UD
K4 UD UD
K45 D UD
S4 UD UD
S5 D UD
Fig. 25: Summary of results (D=Decidable, UD=UnDecidable)
8 Conclusion
8.1 Related Work
Alternatives to the DEL-based approach to multi-agent planning with ToM abilities can be found both
in the literature on temporal epistemic logics [van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2002] and in the literature
on POMDP-based planning [Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi, 2005]. However, these alternative formalisms
express planning tasks in terms of an explicitly given state space, and hence do not address how to express
actions in a compact and convenient formalism (and how to possibly avoid building the entire state space
when solving planning tasks). In the DEL-based formalism the state space is induced by the action
descriptions as in classical planning. Note that our assumptions in DEL-based planning correspond to the
infinite horizon case of planning based on POMDPs, in which already ordinary, single-agent planning is
undecidable [Madani et al., 1999].
8.2 Concluding Remarks
Our results are summarized in the table of Figure 25 (we recall that they hold only for |P | ≥ 2). From
this table, we notice that in the single-agent setting, the property of Euclidicity (defined by Axiom 5:
¬2iφ → 2i¬2iφ) draws the borderline between decidability and undecidability: if 5 is added to K4 or
S4, we immediately obtain decidability.
Given these results, an important quest of course becomes to find fragments of the formalism in
which interesting problems can still be formulated, but where the complexity is comparable to the com-
plexity of other standard planning formalisms (varying from PSPACE-completeness for classical plan-
ning [Bylander, 1994] up to 2-EXP-completeness for planning under nondeterminism and partial observ-
ability [Rintanen, 2004]). We leave the quest for decidable fragments to future work. Initial results in this
direction can be found in [Löwe et al., 2011].
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